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Abstract: Competition between microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries has
increased dramatically in the last decade. We model the behavior of non-profit lenders, and
show that their non-standard, client-maximizing objectives cause them to cross-subsidize
within their pool of borrowers. Thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable
borrowers, it is likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off. As
competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over borrower indebtedness, the
most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple loans, creating a negative externality that
leads to less favorable equilibrium loan contracts for all borrowers.
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1. Introduction
Since Adam Smith, economists have nearly always favored policies that foster competition, as
competition typically results in lower equilibrium prices for consumers. It would be reasonable to
expect therefore that an increase in competition between microfinance institutions would unequivocally
result in more favorable credit contracts for the entrepreneurial poor in developing countries. The
purpose of this paper, however, is to show that competition may actually prove detrimental to some
or all of the borrowers in a microfinance market.
We develop a model in which a solitary client-maximizing microfinance institution (MFI)
competes with an existing informal moneylender to the benefit of each borrower captured in the
microfinance portfolio. Subsequently we show three potentially adverse effects of the entrance of new
MFIs into the same pool of borrowers. First, Bertrand competition between MFIs within the subset of
profitable borrowers reduces the ability of a socially motivated lender to generate rents that support
lending to the poorest and potentially least-profitable borrowers.1 This diminution of the capacity to
cross-subsidize means that the poorest borrowers in the client-maximizing portfolio are dropped as
competition intensifies. Second, we show a number of instances in which failure to restrict grant
funding to the poorest potential borrowers can prevent the emergence of a competitive microfinance
market altogether, as client-maximizing non-profit institutions undercut profit-maximizers to capture the
most profitable borrowers in a given pool.
A third negative effect of MFI competition originates from the likelihood of increasing
asymmetric information between lenders. With a greater number of lenders in a market, we would
expect information sharing between lenders to become more difficult, all else equal. We show that this
creates an incentive for some (impatient) borrowers to take multiple loans. Such instances of multiple
contracting both increase average debt levels among borrowers in the portfolio and decrease the
expected equilibrium repayment rate on all loan transactions, generating less-favorable Bertrand
1

See Shaffer (1996) for an example of cross-subsidization in U.S. lending markets.
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equilibrium credit contracts. This makes all patient borrowers worse off, and again results in the
poorest borrowers being dropped from the loan portfolio. In general, our results show that while
wealthier and impatient borrowers are likely to benefit from increasing competition among MFIs, very
plausible conditions exist under which an increase in the number of lenders in a market will lower the
welfare of the both the poor and the patient.
The widespread enthusiasm for microfinance has spawned a dramatic increase in the number of
microfinance institutions in the developing world. Spurred by an accord reached at the Microfinance
Summit in 1997 to reach 100 million of the world's poorest households with credit, there is arguably
more widespread support for microfinance today than any other single tool for fighting world poverty.
The microfinance movement has been both praised and supported by a broad range of academic
scholars, major development finance institutions such as the World Bank, and development practitioners
themselves. With the number of MFIs involved in this effort now 1,600 and growing, the overlap and
competition between these institutions is certain to increase.
The rapid early growth of the microfinance movement primarily consisted of non-profit, socially
motivated lenders seeking to reach as many poor clients with credit as they were able, given their
limited budgets.2 In the process they demonstrated that through the use of new lending technologies,
such as joint liability contracts and dynamic incentives, a substantial portion of this new market could in
fact be lent to profitably. This realization has drawn profit-motivated lending institutions into these
markets. The presence of competition from profit-driven lenders has forced MFIs in competitive
regions to re-think their strategies. Moreover, donors have questioned the need for continued subsidies,
resulting in the recent focus on “institutional sustainability” in the MFI sector.
Although some current research has begun to touch upon these issues, most of the burgeoning
economic literature on MFIs has been concerned with the impact on MFI clients, (e.g. Pitt and
Khandker, 1998; Morduch, 1998; Wydick, 1999) or papers that examine the properties of the joint
2

Tuckman (1998) provides a good survey of competition among non-profit institutions.
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liability contracts often employed in microenterprise lending (e.g. Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate,
1995; Ghatak, 1999). A limited amount of work, however, has undertaken a broader look at the
industrial organization of the microfinance movement.
Morduch’s (1999, 2000) work is one such example. In a detailed analysis of the Grameen Bank,
Morduch (1999) asserts that the failure to account for tradeoffs between sustainability and poverty
reduction has hamstrung discussion about the subsidies necessary for microfinance to move forward. In
a later paper (Morduch, 2000), he challenges the notion that microfinance provides a ‘win-win’ situation
for all players involved. Instead, he argues that subsidized lending to the poor as well as the creation of
sustainable for-profit institutions should be important, but separate, development goals.
Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega (2001) apply a variant of Conning’s (1999) model to
lenders in Bolivia, showing that a high-screening, individually focused institution and a low-screening
group-lender with poorer clients can coexist in the same market. While their research discusses the
client sorting process that will take place under competition, its focus is different from our work in that
it does not explicitly model interactions between lenders in terms of strategic behavior and multiple
contracting by borrowers when more than one lender exists in the market. Rather, they model the
second entrant to the market as a Stackelberg follower who focuses on collateral-based lending and
hence captures the wealthiest and most productive segment of the market.
More similar to this paper in its approach to strategic behavior is Hoff and Stiglitz (1998), who
show that subsidies to a lending market can generate the perverse consequences of market exit and
increasing equilibrium prices. In their model, these effects can arise either as a result of the loss of scale
economies, or due to a weakening of reputation effects as the number of lenders dilutes information in
the market. We also relate information asymmetries to poorer equilibrium loan contracts for borrowers
in Section 4 of this paper. However, in the Hoff and Stiglitz model, perverse effects are caused by the
weakening of dynamic repayment incentives, whereas in our model it is caused by asymmetric
information between lenders over borrower indebtedness.
3

Other papers have also examined the industrial organization of credit markets. Petersen and
Rajan (1995) show that multi-period, state-contingent contracts, or “relationship banking” is an efficient
contracting device for dealing with asymmetric information, and for this reason market power can lead
to lower quality firms obtaining finance. Similarly, since the screening required in multi-lender markets
is wasteful, the authors demonstrate that borrower welfare can decrease as competition intensifies.
Broecker (1990), examining an equilibrium under Bertrand competition, shows that imperfect
information provides an additional reason for undercutting, as offering the prevailing interest rate causes
the lender to attract only those borrowers rejected by other lenders. Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), illustrate
a “blockaded” market, where Bertrand competition leads to no more than two lenders being present in a
market in equilibrium. Marquez (2002), however, presents a model where entry is easier as turnover
increases, weakening blockading. A more applied view of the escalating competition present in
microfinance markets is provided by Rhyne and Christen (1999), who suggest that information sharing
in the form of credit bureaus is becoming increasingly necessary as the microfinance market matures.
2. Increasing Numbers and Competition among MFIs
We wish to motivate our theoretical model with evidence from three areas of the world in which MFI
activity has reached a relatively advanced stage, and where the effects of competition between MFIs
have become increasingly clear.
Bangladesh: The Grameen Bank, long the flagship of the microfinance movement, has
consistently been upheld as a pinnacle of stability, self-sufficiency, and effectiveness in using
microfinance as a tool for lifting households from poverty. Yet the Grameen Bank's well-known
successes have encouraged imitators, which compete for borrowers’ attention along with two other very
large microcredit providers, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Rural
Development Project 12 (RD-12), that have operated alongside the Grameen Bank for more than a
decade. A front page Wall Street Journal article in November 2001 raised warnings about the financial
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health of the Grameen Bank, asserting “imitators have brought on more competition, making it harder
for Grameen to control their borrowers”. The article points in particular to the Grameen Bank’s lending
in the region of Tangail, in which competitive pressures have reduced interest rates for some borrowers,
but where 32.1 percent of the Grameen Bank’s loans have fallen more than two years overdue:
In Tangail, signboards for rival Micro lenders dot a landscape of gravel roads, jute fields and ponds with
simple fishing nets. Shopkeepers playing cards in the village of Bagil Bazar can cite from memory the
terms being offered by seven competing microlenders--a typical repayment plan for a 1,000-taka ($17) loan
is 25 taka for 46 weeks. At an annualized rate, that works out to 30% in interest. Surveys have estimated
that 23% to 43% of families borrowing from microlenders in Tangail borrow from more than one.
(WSJ: 11/27/2001)

Such conditions in Bangladesh, with perhaps the world’s most developed microfinance industry, have
put huge financial pressures on lenders, and have led to spiraling default rates. Where once Grameen
boasted repayment rates of 95% or higher, the Wall Street Journal reports 19% of the portfolio overdue
by a year or more. Alarming figures such as these have intensified efforts by the World Bank and
CGAP to help bring together a network of the largest 20 microfinance institutions in Bangladesh to
implement a centrally managed credit information system during 2004. It is hoped that more “centrally
managed” competition between lenders in Bangladesh will both help to foster healthy competition
between MFIs while bringing down arrears rates in MFI portfolios.
East Africa: While East Africa is at an earlier stage of competition, the major urban centers of
Uganda and Kenya are becoming saturated by competition among numerous MFIs (see Kaffu &
Mutesasira, 2003). Markets for the more wealthy borrowers that were previously dominated by grantfunded, socially motivated lenders are now being contested by private institutions. For example,
CERUDEB and CMF, two private lenders with access to subsidized external lines of credit, have begun
competing with existing MFIs for larger microcredit borrowers. In response, there is increasing
competitive pressure on socially motivated MFIs, whose interest rates may be more than 1% per month
higher than the new competition.
FAULU, one of the few major MFIs to operate in both Uganda and Kenya, is troubled by the
increasing presence of borrowers unknowingly receiving loans from multiple lenders. FAULU reports
5

that such behavior has become increasingly prevalent as the intensity of MFI activity increases. The
Kenya office is able to employ a risk management network based on the country’s national ID system to
detect clients within their own portfolio with multiple loans. Uganda, however, has no such national ID
system, and so they are powerless to monitor the problem, even within their own institution.
Central America: The increase in both the size and number of MFIs operating in Central
America since the mid-1990s has been astounding. Much of the reason for this has been political: both
the United States and the European Union have desired to develop an entrepreneurial middle-class in the
region in order to try to bridge the societal divisions responsible for civil wars during the 1980s. As a
result, growth in MFI activity has been particularly heavy in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
(Insert Table 1 here)
The case of Nicaragua is typical of the region. FAMA, an ACCION International affiliate,
enjoyed a virtual monopoly in microfinance lending in the Managua area for the few years after it
commenced operations in 1992. However, by 1996 approximately six other major MFIs entered the
market, though even by 1997 no MFIs in the region had a portfolio of more than 4,000 borrowers.
Moreover, according to ASOMIF, the association of Nicaraguan microfinance institutions, the
portfolios of Nicaraguan MFIs grew at an annual rate of 47% between 1997 and 2001 (La Prensa,
10/02/2002). By 2001 the largest MFIs were carrying portfolios in the range of 15,000-25,000
borrowers, with considerable overlap in geographical operating regions. Table 1 gives USAID data
illustrating microlending growth during 1999-2001 of the five largest MFIs receiving USAID funding.
Note that as portfolios have increased dramatically, levels of arrears have also risen in all but one case.
Guatemala and El Salvador have experienced similarly dramatic growth in MFI activity.
FUNDAP in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, like its sister ACCION institution in Nicaragua, experienced
very little competition from other MFIs since its inception in 1988 until the mid-1990s. New entrants
into its regional market, such as FUNDESPE and Fe y Alegria, have forced FUNDAP to cut interest
rates on its larger loans from 3% to 2.5% per month. To remain solvent under competition, it has pulled
6

away from its initial mission of offering smaller loans in the form of group-based credit, and instead
now lends to a wealthier, more lucrative segment of the market. While average initial loan size was
US$135 and average monthly sales were US$291 for borrowers receiving their first loans between 1988
and 1993, by 1999 these figures for new clients had grown to US$543 and US$672, respectively.3
Asymmetric information between lenders over borrower quality and indebtedness has been a
mounting issue in all three countries, but there have been great differences between the three countries
in the level of cooperation realized between MFIs to mitigate the problem. El Salvador, with its
internet-driven Info-Red borrower database4, represents the best example of a case where a network of
independent MFIs have built information-based institutions reminiscent of those in developed countries,
where nearly instantaneous credit checks are possible. In Guatemala, multiple contracting by MFI
clients had become so damaging by the late 1990s that REDIMIF, an association of 19 MFIs embarked
on an effort to establish CREDIREF, a centralized microfinance credit bureau, which though now
functional, is still in its nascent stages. Cooperation between MFIs during the mid-1990s was fairly
strong in Nicaragua; institutions regularly shared information on poorly performing borrowers with one
another. However, as MFIs poured into the market in the late 1990s, cooperation has deteriorated to
such an extent that, as one loan officer put it "our information-sharing consists of a trip to the local
cantina to ask neighbors if loan officers from other MFIs have been paying visits to a potential client.”
3. Basic Model: Full Information
3.1 Analytical framework
Consider an MFI operating in a large pool of potential borrowers who, for well-established
reasons, are denied access to credit in the formal financial sector. New lending technologies such as
group lending, community banking, and dynamic incentives (as well as the possibility of grant funding)
have allowed an MFI access to these borrowers. Let this pool of potential borrowers be defined by the
3
4

Figures are inflation-adjusted. Source: sample of 376 field surveys conducted in Guatemala in 1994-1999.
Info Red’s internet-based system can be accessed at http://www.infored.com.sv.
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≡ {1, 2,...n} where

set

pertaining to each i ∈

is indexed in ascending order of an initial level of productive assets ki,
. The corresponding set of initial assets

MFI and uniformly distributed within

≡ {k1 , k 2 ...k n } is observable to the

such that k i +1 − k i = ξ , where ξ =

k −k
, and for notational
n −1

ease we denote the lowest level of endowment, k1, as k and the highest, kn, as k .
For each borrower i ∈

, the MFI considers granting a loan Vi at an interest rate ri. The interest

cost of capital for the MFI is equal to c, and on each loan it incurs fixed administrative costs F. The
loan offered by the MFI is subject to a participation constraint, representing the best alternative source
of financing by borrower i. We will represent this best alternative financing as offered by a local
moneylender competing over the same set of potential borrowers

(

)

Π iB Vi m , ri m to borrower i ∈

offering loans that return a profit

. The moneylender has lower fixed costs per loan than the MFI, Fm < F,

but a higher cost of capital, cm > c, and thus operates at a cost disadvantage (advantage) for loan sizes
Vi > (< )

F − Fm
. We assume that prior to the entry of the MFI, the monopolistic moneylender operates
cm − c

in a predatory manner as in Basu (1984), such that the moneylender is able to induce any borrower i to
accept a loan contract that leaves his client with only some very small level of profit, ε > 0.
If a borrower receives a loan, the resulting investment yields a low return per unit of borrowed
capital of β < 1 with probability pi (k i , Vi ) due to a lack of ability to post sufficient collateral, and a high
return of β > 1 + ri with probability 1 − pi (k i , Vi ) . We posit that the probability of the low return, in
which the borrower is forced to default on 1 - β of the principal is decreasing in ki and increasing in Vi .
This is equivalent to saying that a wealthier individual has a higher probability of repaying a loan of a
given size than a poorer individual, and that increasing the size of the loan to a given individual cannot
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increase the probability of repayment.6 To simplify our model, we assume pv > 0 and pk < 0 to be
constant and that pi = p + pvVi + p k k i .7 We abstract from strategic default in the sense that any project
yield up to and including (1 + ri )Vi is forfeited to the lender. Profit to the borrower is thus
Π iB = (1 − p i )( β − (1 + ri ))Vi

(1)

while profit to the MFI is
Π iMFI = (1 − pi )(1 + ri )Vi + pi βVi − (1 + c)Vi − F .

(2)

The profit function of the moneylender is identical to that of the lending institution, except for the
moneylender’s lower fixed costs per loan, F m , and higher cost of capital, c m . The slope of the
borrower’s isoprofit curves can be derived through total differentiation of (1) to obtain
dVi
− Vi (1 − p )
=
(β − (1 + ri ))( pvVi − (1 − p )) .
dri

(3)

The isoprofit curves for the borrower are strictly decreasing in ri and backward-bending with respect
to Vi because the borrower fears default as the loan becomes too large. Similarly we totally
differentiate (2) to obtain the slope of the lender’s isoprofit curves:
dVi
Vi (1 − p i )
.
=
( pvVi + pi ) 1 + ri − β − (ri − c )
dri

(

(4)

)

The lender’s isoprofit curves are increasing in ri and also backward-bending in Vi due to the risk
of default in large loans. The lender’s isoprofit curves are positively (negatively) sloped for values of
Vi > (<)

1
2 pv

(ri − c )

(1 + r − β )

− p − p k k i . Note that cm > c implies that the indifference curves of the

i

moneylender are steeper on the negatively sloped portion and flatter on the positively sloped portion;
the critical Vi at which the slope becomes vertical is also lower than for the MFI. The borrower’s

Boundary conditions on parameters given in the Appendix guarantee that

7

For analytical tractability, we assume p to be independent of the interest rate.
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[ ]

pi ∈ (0,1) for all k i ∈ k , k .

6

isoprofit curves at ri < β − 1 are positively (negatively) sloped for Vi < (>)

1
(1 − p − pk k i ) . This
2 pv

implies that the value of Vi at which the borrower’s isoprofit curve bends backward is higher than that
for the lender if 1 + c and 1 + c m > β (see Assumption 3 below). This and other assumptions in our
model include the following:
Assumption 1: “Moneylender Feasibility”. In the absence of competition, the moneylender can offer
some loan to every borrower in the pool that is weakly profitable for both. In other words for each
i∈

, ∃ some (Vi , ri ) for which Π ML (V (ki ), r(ki )) ≥ 0 and Π B (V (k i ), r (k i )) ≥ 0 . This implies k is

larger than some minimum value whose terms, given in the parameters of the model, are provided in
the Appendix.
Assumption 2: “Microfinance Lending Environment”. When an MFI competes with a moneylender,
there exists more than one profitable borrower and at least one unprofitable borrower for the MFI in
the borrower pool. In other words, at its optimal loan contract (Vi* , ri* ) for each i ∈
have

i
i∈Π MFI (V *, r *) > 0

> 1 and

i
i∈Π MFI (V *, r *)< 0

, we

≥ 1 . The parameters that satisfy this condition are also

detailed in the Appendix.
Assumption 3: “Potential Lender Loss”. We assume both the moneylender and the MFI will lose money
in the bad state of nature for the borrower, or specifically that 1 + c m and 1 + c > β . This is
consistent with what we expect to be true in a developing-country context: a lender will lose money
under default and will require more interest to risk larger loans in equilibrium. It implies that
equilibrium contracts reside on the positive slope of both lender and borrower isoprofit curves.
These assumptions are necessary for equilibrium calibration of the model; we also believe they reflect
the lending environment within which most MFIs operate in the developing areas of the world.

10

3.2 The MFI as client-maximizer
The behavior of a profit-maximizing lender is well understood, but less clear is the objective of a nonprofit MFI, as are the great preponderance of NGOs involved in microlending. We argue here that the
objective of such an institution is typically to maximize its “outreach”, or the number of clients, n*,
captured into its portfolio. The constraints are a net budget-balancing requirement, the participation
constraint, and non-negativity constraints. A non-profit, client-maximizing MFI which (potentially)
receives grant funding, , therefore solves the following problem:

Maximize n* subject to
Vi , ri

BC:

Π iMFI (Vi , ri ) + G ≥ 0

(Institutional Budget Constraint)

PC: Π iB (Vi , ri ) ≥ Π iB (Vi m , ri m )

(Borrower Participation Constraint)

NC: Vi , ri ≥ 0

(Non-negativity Constraints)

for all i captured in the MFI borrower portfolio.
The intuition of the MFI problem, given more formally in the proofs of LEMMAS 1 and 2, is
straightforward, and is as follows: The MFI maximizes its number of clients, n*, by first capturing the
set of profitable borrowers,
contract9 (Vi , ri ) to i ∈

P

P

, from the moneylender. This is accomplished though offering a

that leaves each i ∈

P

indifferent to the best contract the moneylender is

able to offer (at which Π iML (Vi m , ri m ) = 0 and the PC binds). These equilibrium contracts are profitable
for the MFI but not to the moneylender, since on larger loans, the MFI’s lower cost of capital more than
makes up for its higher fixed lending costs. To maximize the number of borrowers in its portfolio, the

9

Though little variation in interest rates is often observed in less competitive microfinance markets, much greater variation
in interest rates among different types of borrowers is observed as financial markets mature and become more competitive,
as seen for example in economies with highly developed financial systems. In the more mature microfinance markets in
Central America, we are already beginning to observe competitive pressure giving birth to multiple loan products at differing
interest rates that are targeted at a borrowers with varying levels of initial assets.
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surplus,

from lending to

borrowers

NP

.

~ NP
1

P

is used to subsidize loans to

~ NP

, a subset of the non-profitable

thus consists of the set of m* unprofitable borrowers captured into the portfolio

by means of cross subsidy A and grant funding . Cross-subsidization begins with the borrowers

{i

kˆ

}

− 1, ikˆ − 2... on whom losses are the smallest on the MFI contract at the point where the PC binds.

The number of unprofitable borrowers m* in the portfolio is then maximized by offering contracts to
increasingly poorer borrowers until the BC binds. Borrowers too poor to be reached by the MFI receive
the exploitative monopoly moneylender contract for which Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) = ε .11 The following lemmas
are foundational for the propositions that follow:
LEMMA 1: There exists a Pareto-efficient contract curve for every loan made between a lender and each
borrower i.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
By setting (3) equal to (4) we obtain the tangency points between the isoprofit curves of the MFI and
borrower i. This condition reduces to

( pvVi + pi )(β − β ) − (β − (1 + c )) = 0

(5a)

which forms an Edgeworth-like contract curve for each borrower given by the dark horizontal curves in
Figures 1a and 1b. (The moneylender’s contract curve is shown by the lower dashed line.) By
substituting the default function into (5a) we obtain
Vi* (k i ) =

1 β − (1 + c)
− p − pk ki
2 pv
β −β

(

)

(5b)

noting that the moneylender’s optimal contract is identical except that Vi m ∗ (k i ) < Vi* (ki ) since cm > c.
The contract curves are linear and horizontal, meaning that differences in the contractual interest rate
represent a direct transfer of profit between the borrower and lender. Figure 1a gives the example of a
borrower i ∈

P

, for whom the MFI surplus is positive where the PC is binding. In Figure 1b, the

11

If we relax Assumption 1, then the MFI may able to reach poorer borrowers than the moneylender. This complicates the
model, though the main results of the model are unchanged except that in order to reach the maximum number of borrowers
the true client-maximizing MFI will extract the entire surplus from loans to such borrowers.
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surplus is negative to the MFI for a borrower i ∈

~ NP

at the point where the PC binds. It is important to

see how borrower welfare increases by virtue of entry from the MFI, moving from points A to A* and B
to B*, respectively. Entry of the MFI makes borrower profits rise and moneylender profits fall, so that
the equilibrium contract changes from a contract that lies at zero profit for the borrower to a contract
~
that lies at zero profit for the moneylender for all i ∈ P ∪ NP .
(Insert Figures 1a and 1b here.)
LEMMA 2: The client-maximizing objective yields an equilibrium loan contract in which (i) V * (ki ) is
increasing in ki, (ii) equilibrium profit to the MFI is increasing in ki, (iii) lending to poorer
borrowers is subsidized by profits from wealthier borrowers, (iv) a unique number of clients receive
loans from the MFI for any microfinance subsidy

≥ 0.

PROOF: See the Appendix.
In Figure 2 we can observe the two pivotal asset endowments: k̂ i ∈
~
break-even borrower, while k i ∈

is the asset endowment of the
~ NP

is the asset endowment of the borrower i ∈

who causes the BC

~
to bind, and so is the poorest agent offered credit by the client-maximizing MFI. We denote k (0) as the
~
poorest agent served by the MFI in the absence of grant funding and k (G ) as the poorest served in the

presence of some

> 0.

We believe the equilibrium illustrated in LEMMA 2 is the typical case of microfinance markets.
In a borrower pool in which all borrowers have extremely low initial endowments and

P

= {∅}, only

grant-funded agencies can survive. In cases in which all borrowers have very high endowments and
NP

= {∅}, we should observe all lending conducted by for-profit lenders rather than grant-supported

NGOs. The typical microfinance market is the intermediate case where cross-subsidization within a
given client pool is possible, and the losses realized on loans to borrowers ∈
combination of grants and profits made from lending to borrowers ∈

P

~ NP

can be covered by a

. One implication of this is that

when there is a single client-maximizing MFI that has access to the borrowing pool, there is no need to
target grant funding towards the poor in this intermediate case. All surplus is automatically directed to
the poorest clients. Figure 2 illustrates the surplus by borrower across the set

13

:

(Insert Figure 2 here.)

3.3 Competition from a profit-maximizing market entrant
In many parts of the world, the new lending technology has begun to attract profit-seeking entrants
into the microfinance market.12 We now consider the effects of the entrance of a competing MFI, where
unlike with the incumbent moneylender, the incumbent MFI and entrant MFI possess the same lending
technology. Assume first that the incumbent is a client-maximizing MFI with

= 0. The profit

maximizer solves the following, more familiar problem:
max
Vi ,ri

i =1

ΠiMFI , subject to:

PC: Π iB (Vi , ri ) ≥ Π iB (Vi* , ri* ), Π iB (Vi m , ri m )

(Participation Constraint)

NC: Π iMFI , Vi , ri ≥ 0 ∀ i

(Non-negativity Constraint)

Based on their respective objective functions, Bertrand competition by these identical MFIs will take
place over i ∈

P

, which induces undercutting for all borrowers for whom the PC and the NC are

satisfied. Under competition solely with the moneylender, the PC of the cross-subsidizing MFI’s binds
for all borrowers i ∈

P

∪

~ NP

ML
m
m
at the level where Π i (Vi , ri ) = 0 . For the profit-maximizing MFI

under competition, it is the NC that binds for all i ∈

P

because the incumbent MFI, using identical

technology, then defines the PC. For the break-even borrower ikˆ ∈

, both constraints are binding

under both market structures, and so the contract offers are the same. We denote the equilibrium MFI
contract under moneylender competition as (Vi* , ri* ) , and the Bertrand competitive equilibrium after
entry of a second MFI by (Vi** , ri** ).
PROPOSITION 1: Bertrand competition between MFIs benefits wealthier borrowers, but makes a group
of poorer borrowers worse off.
12

Two examples in Guatemala are BanRural and BanCafe, formal lenders that have entered the microfinance market, and
now are major providers of microcredit in the country; another example is the well-known BancoSol in Boliva.

14

PROOF: The proof follows in a straightforward manner from LEMMAS 1 and 2. Under Bertrand
competition between MFIs, Π iMFI (Vi** , ri** ) → 0 for ∀ i ∈

P

. Since by LEMMA 1 all contracts in

equilibrium are Pareto efficient, this implies that Π iB (Vi** , ri** ) > Π iB (Vi * , ri* ) for ∀ i ∈

(

)

Π iMFI Vi** , ri** = 0 for ∀ i ∈

borrower profits for ∀ i ∈

P

~ NP

P

. Because

in equilibrium, this renders cross-subsidization impossible. Therefore,
fall from Π iB (Vi * , ri* ) to Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) where (Vi m , ri m ) is the monopolistic

moneylender contract. We know that Π iB (Vi * , ri* ) > Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) because when two MFIs compete in
Bertrand equilibrium we have Π iML (Vi m , ri m ) > 0 and Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) = ε for ∀ i ∈
only a single MFI competitor the PC binds for ∀ i ∈

~ NP

~ NP

. Conversely, with

by LEMMA 2, implying that at Π iB (Vi* , ri* ) we

have Π iML (Vi m , ri m ) = 0 . Since all contracts in equilibrium are Pareto efficient by LEMMA 1, an
equilibrium contract such that Π iML (Vi m , ri m ) = 0 therefore implies that Π iB (Vi* , ri* ) > ε.
Notice that faced with entry by a profit-maximizing MFI, the client-maximizing MFI responds
by conforming to the behavior of a profit-maximizing MFI. Profits to the Bertrand competitors go to
zero in equilibrium; all surplus is captured in higher profits to the wealthiest borrowers in

.

3.4 Competitive equilibrium with non-targeted subsidies
We will refer to a subsidy that has been earmarked by the donor for underwriting the costs of loans
specifically to unprofitable (poorer) borrowers as a “targeted” subsidy, while we refer to subsidies that
are at the full discretion of the lender as “non-targeted”. Because a non-targeted subsidy can be used to
undercut contracts to profitable clients, the presence of such grants will thwart the realization of the
Bertrand equilibrium when another MFI is unsubsidized.
PROPOSITION 2: The presence of a client-maximizing MFI with a non-targeted subsidy will prevent the
entry, or force the exit of, any unsubsidized MFI.
PROOF: In order to maximize the number of borrowers in its portfolio, the client-maximizing MFI with
a non-targeted subsidy minimizes the loss from capturing each borrower into its portfolio,
15

P

∪

~ NP

.

Since it is the NC rather than the PC with the moneylender that is binding under Bertrand competition,
borrowers in

P

require the smallest draw on the subsidy. Therefore, the subsidized MFI minimizes its

(

**
loss on each borrower through a contract of Vi , ri − ζ
**

) to ∀ i ∈

P

, where ζ is arbitrarily small.

Such a contract lies on the Pareto efficient contract curve by LEMMA 1, and hence is preferred by

(

)

(

borrower i since Π iB Vi** , ri − ζ > Π iB Vi** , ri
**

**

).

Since MFIs are assumed to be identical in lending

(

)

technology, a contract on the contract curve that yields Π iB Vi** , ri − ζ implies that

(

**

)

Π iMFI Vi ** , ri − ζ < 0 , therefore leaving no independently feasible contract for the unsubsidized MFI.
**

PROPOSITION 3: Competition between two client-maximizing MFIs with non-targeted subsidies will lead
to a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in which the market share of each MFI will be proportional to its level
of grant funding.
PROOF: See the Appendix
The intuition to the proof is that since Bertrand competition eliminates profits on each profitable
borrower i ∈

P

, all borrowers must be captured through competitive subsidy in the client

maximization process. One can think of each subsidized MFI as “purchasing” borrowers for its
portfolio, where in equilibrium, arbitrage behavior takes place such that the “market price” of capturing
each borrower is equilibrated across all those with access to MFI credit. The resulting Nash equilibrium
can be seen in Figure 3 (with the example of

), where the specific borrower i served by each

institution is undetermined. Note that and that all borrowers that remain in the portfolio

P

∪

~ NP

are

(weakly) better off than under cross-subsidization.
(Insert Figure 3 here.)
3.5 Competition from an MFI market entrant with a targeted subsidy
If one competitor is a client-maximizer with a targeted subsidy and the other a client-maximizer
with a non-targeted subsidy, then the competitive equilibrium is different from the previous case since
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the targeting lender is prevented from expending grant resources on profitable clients. As a result, the

(

**
non-targeting lender must only offer Vi , ri − ζ

targeting lender can capture i ∈

P

**

) in order to capture all i ∈

P

at negligible cost, it is likewise able to focus (nearly) all of its grant

resources on capturing as many i ∈

NP

as possible. The nature of the grant-based competition is the

same as the previous case, except only contracts to the poorer borrowers, i ∈
PROPOSITION 3 now holds only over unprofitable borrowers; the share of
now becomes proportional to grant funding. Thus, all i ∈
all i ∈

~ NP

to make all

. Since the non-

P

NP

~ NP

, are contested.

captured by each lender

are better off if neither lender targets, but

are better off if even one lender targets. (Note that only

- 1 targeting lenders are required

client-maximizing lenders behave as if they were targeting.)

PROPOSITION 4: Market entry of a client-maximizing, subsidized MFI with funding specifically targeted
to poor borrowers may cause poor borrowers to lose access to MFI credit.
PROOF: Recall that

≡
i∈

P

Π iMFI or the total profits realized on profitable borrowers by the incumbent

client-maximizing MFI1 facing only moneylender competition (equal to the area

in Figure 2).

Case (a): The incumbent is unsubsidized. As the entrant (MFI2) and incumbent MFI1 engage in

Bertrand competition over i ∈

P

→ 0 . In the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, the total subsidy for

,

< then
lending to the set of poorer borrowers NP will be smaller unless ≥ . If
~
~
~
~
~
~
k ( ) > k (0 ) , which implies ∃ i for which i ∈ NP , but i ∉ NP , where NP , NP ⊂ NP are the sets
of non-profitable borrowers captured before and after entry of the competing MFI. Any i for which
~
~
i ∈ NP but i ∉ NP is strictly worse off since Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) < Π iB (Vi* , ri* ) by PROPOSITION 1.
Case (b): The incumbent has a targeted subsidy. (This case is a hybrid between the unsubsidized

competitive equilibrium and the client-maximizer with an untargeted subsidy from section 3.5.)
~
Without competition from the entrant MFI, the PC is binding for ∀ i ∈ NP by LEMMA 2, and the total
subsidy needed to capture each i ∈

~ NP
1

into the portfolio is

entry by a client-maximizing MFI with targeted subsidy
is similar to that in PROPOSITION 3 in that Π iMFI = Π MFI
j
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~
i∈B NP

(

Π iMFI Vi* , ri*

)

=

+

. Consider

. The ensuing competitive Nash equilibrium
~
< 0 for i ∈ 2NP except that the targeted nature

of the subsidies results in Π iMFI = 0 for ∀ i ∈
binds in competitive equilibrium for i ∈
subsidy allocated to

~ NP

. In contrast to case without MFI competition, the PC

only for the poorest borrower, ik~ (

+ G2 )

, and the total MFI

equals (m1* + m2* ) Π iMFI = G1+G2 , i = ik~ (G +G ) . (Refer to the proof of
1

PROPOSITION 3). Thus for
otherwise it must be that

~ NP

P

~ NP
2

~ NP
2

~ NP

⊇

⊂

1

~ NP
1

, we must have

2

≥ m1* ⋅ Π iMFI
−
′

. Observing that m1* ⋅ Π iMFI
−
′

, where i ′ = ik~ (G ) ,
1

> , note that the conditions for

the poorest borrowers losing access to MFI credit are less restrictive in Case (b) than in Case (a).
If

indeed falls below the critical level shown in Case (b), then there are both winners and
NP

losers within

~ NP

under competition between MFIs with targeted subsidies. The set of borrowers

2

are better off since competition to attract them into the portfolios increases the subsidy level of their
~
~
equilibrium contract. In contrast, those in 1NP but left out of 2NP are worse off since upon being
dropped from the MFI portfolio, their profits fall from Π iB (Vi * , ri* ) to Π iB (Vi m , ri m ) .
An interesting implication of PROPOSITIONS 3 and 4 is that a maximum number of borrowers
could be reached under a collusive strategy between the two MFIs. In a collusive strategy, MFIs could
agree to split the market by jointly offering contracts at which the PC with the moneylender is binding.
By PROPOSITION 3, the collusive strategy is not a Nash equilibrium. However, collusion generates a total
subsidy of

+

with MFI credit access. Thus for any given
~ NP
2

⊂

~ NP
2C

NP

+ G2 to capture borrowers in
<

, resulting in a larger set of poor borrowers,

we have

~ NP
2

⊂

~ NP
1

⊂

~ NP
2C

~ NP
2C

,

, noting, however, that

would have less favorable contracts under collusion than competition. The difficulties of

sustaining collusion in this model are typical of any cartel, especially for loans to profitable borrowers.
Nevertheless, it is interesting that collusion between client-maximizing lenders leads to the maximum
redistribution towards the poor and the most evenly distributed benefits of microlending.
3.6 Summary of Conclusions from the Basic Competitive Model:
•

Entry of an MFI is beneficial to all borrowers accessing MFI credit; it increases borrower profits
from the optimal contract for the moneylender to the reservation profit of the moneylender.
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•

In competitive markets, profit-maximizers and unsubsidized client-maximizers always behave
the same way. Thus, under competition it is not the motivation, but rather the extent and the
nature of the grant funding of a lender that matters.

•

Targeting of subsidies is unimportant in a market with a single client-maximizing MFI; the
distinction only becomes important under MFI competition.

•

Lenders with non-targeted subsidies can always drive any unsubsidized competitor out of the
market altogether, whereas targeted subsidies can never eliminate a competitor from the market.

•

Every competitive scenario involving a lender with targeted subsidies results in a market that is
both competitive and in which some of the poor receive loans.

•

Competition never makes any profitable borrower worse off.

•

The only way in which the poor can be reached without subsidies is if a client maximizer exists
as a solitary MFI in the market and competes only with a moneylender. However, in this case
subsidies are merely being generated from amongst the other, less poor borrowers.

•

If rents to the incumbent MFI from lending to the non-poor are higher than the grant funding of
an entrant MFI, then the entrant can actually decrease the funding available to underwrite loans
to the poor even if the grants are targeted specifically towards the poor.

•

Collusive behavior between client-maximizing MFIs can result in the maximum number of
borrowers reached by MFIs, and the most evenly distributed benefits among borrowers.

4. Extended Model: Asymmetric Information between Lenders

4.1 Asymmetric information and dynamic incentives
In the previous section, we developed a basic model in which information about borrower
heterogeneity was common knowledge between borrower and lender. An implicit assumption of the
basic model is that a lender is able to ascertain the optimal contract through observation of a borrower’s
capital endowment. We continue to assume that heterogeneity in
19

remains observable to the MFI.

However, we now assume that each borrower i ∈

is characterized by a personal rate of time

preference, ρi ∈ [ ρ , ρ ] per lending period, information that is hidden to the MFI, whose per-period
profit function we assume is unchanged and homogeneous across institutions. Let g (ρ i ) represents the
density function of ρi and G (ρ i ) its associated distribution function. The distribution of time preference
is assumed to be orthogonal to the distribution of k. Timing is more important in the extended model,
so we lay it out explicitly as follows:
(Insert Figure 4 here.)
We now bring into our analysis the issue of dynamic incentives. Dynamic incentives provide
motivation for repayment when borrowers lack collateral to secure loans by implicitly promising
continued credit access as a reward for loan repayment. They are routinely used by MFIs (and other
lenders) in poor areas of developing countries to mitigate issues of moral hazard involved with credit
transactions. The present value to a borrower of the continued access to MFI credit, Γ(ki , ρ i ) , is
positively related to the advantage offered by MFI financing relative to the alternative (moneylender)
contract, and a negatively related to a borrower’s rate of time preference.13
To focus our attention on issues related to problems of asymmetric information and competition,
we will concentrate on the case of two MFIs engaged in Bertrand competition over the pool of
borrowers with i ∈

P

(Competition over i ∈

NP

yields similar results.) Hoff and Stiglitz (1998)

show that dynamic incentives are weakened by new market entrants as this improves the reservation
loan contract available to borrowers in the case of default. Their results imply borrowers must
somehow be punished for default by the financial system as a whole, through a system of negative
borrower information-sharing, i.e. each lender sharing its lista negra (as it is often referred to in Latin
American MFIs--the blacklist).

13

To concentrate our analysis on borrower behavior we assume that lenders continue to maximize single-period profits;
the results derived are consistent with lender discounting provided that all lenders share the same discounting process.
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What we illustrate in this section is that even within a system that identifies defaulting
borrowers, other gaps involving asymmetric information between lenders must be bridged. We show
that it is also critical for lenders to share positive borrower information with one another, even regarding
well-performing loans, i.e. that a lista blanca (a list of positive information) is also necessary. This is
true even in a model without strategic default. In order to concentrate on this issue, we take as our
informational benchmark market with Bertrand competition in which all lenders fully share the lista
negra, where defaulters are denied future formal credit access, but no positive information is shared.
The objective function of borrower i under dynamic incentives now becomes

[(

]

)

Max Π iB = (1 − pi ) β − (1 + ri ) Vi + Γ(k i , ρ i ) .

(6)

As ρi increases, the borrower becomes less concerned about lack of future credit access, and with any
ki ∈

, prefers a larger loan size. We see this through total differentiation of (6) with respect to

Vi and ri which yields

− V i (1 − p i )
dV i
=
(β − (1 + r )i )( p vV i − (1 − p i )) − p v Γ (k i , ρ i )
dri

(7)

Notice as ρi increases, the borrower’s indifference curve rotates clockwise, with the upwardsloping part of the curve becoming flatter and the downward sloping part becoming steeper as in
Figure 5. This implies that, for example, in a Bertrand equilibrium for ρ2 > ρ1
Vi **

ρ2

> Vi**

ρ1

and ri**

ρ2

> ri**

ρ1

(8)

or that the equilibrium contract for a more impatient borrower is characterized by a higher loan size and
interest rate than the contract for a more patient borrower. Thus an MFI operating in the context of
information sharing between lenders about borrower indebtedness does not face a hidden information
problem; it can infer a borrower’s impatience from ki and the requested loan size. As ρi varies for any
given ki, it creates a unique tangency point on the isoprofit curve of the lender at a unique level of Vi for
any given ki, i.e. Vi* (k i ) =

1 β − (1 + c) − pv Γ(k i , ρ i )
− p − pk k i . As Figure 5 shows, with full
2 pv
β −β

(

)
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information sharing, an MFI could make up for the increased likelihood of default on this larger loan
size by offering even the most impatient borrower a larger loan at a higher interest rate.
However, when there are multiple lenders and an absence of information sharing about borrower
indebtedness between them, there is an incentive for borrowers past a certain level ρi = ρ * to take
multiple loans, where we assume ρ* ∈ ( ρ , ρ ). Previous work typically adds the prevention of multiple
contracting as a constraint for the principal; instead we take the approach of seeing how multiple
contracting by borrowers emerges without safeguards, and how the sharing of information can be used
to prevent it.14 Let ρ * be the lowest value of ρi that satisfies the following inequality, in which
expected profits from multiple loans are higher for the borrower than on a single loan:

(

( ))[(β − (1 + ~r ))2V~ + Γ(k , ρ )] > (1 − p (V ))[(β − (1 + r ))V + Γ(k , ρ )]

~
Π iB = α ⋅ ε ρ i + (1 − α ) 1 − pi 2Vi

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

(9)

where α represents an information parameter such that an MFI is able to identify a borrower’s true level
of indebtedness with probability α before a borrower receives a loan.15 Unless there are institutional
arrangements for information-sharing between lenders, field experience has shown that α typically falls
as the number of MFIs in a given market increases.
The difference in behavior between more patient and less patient borrowers is illustrated
graphically in Figure 5 where, for example, the most patient borrower with ρi = ρ receives an
equilibrium contract for loan of size Vi (k i ) at interest rate ri (Vi (k i )) . Under full information sharing, the
less patient borrower with ρi = ρ* receives an equilibrium contract for a loan 2Vi at the higher interest
rate ri (2Vi ) . A single lender is thus willing to oblige such a borrower by providing a larger loan along
its zero-profit offer curve at a higher interest rate that accounts for the higher expected rate of default.
14

The problem of multiple contracting in markets with asymmetric information is not unique to microfinance; see Cawley
and Philipson (1999) for an application to life-insurance markets, and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) for a more general
model of non-exclusive contracting in credit markets.
15

We clarify three additional simplifying assumptions in the extended model: borrowers discovered with multiple loans are
culled from the portfolio, a borrower who defaults on any loan defaults on all loans, and a borrower who defaults on an MFI
loan is henceforth able to access credit only from the moneylender.
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This is the contract that will exist in the absence of information asymmetries under exclusive
contracting between borrower and lender.
(Insert Figure 5 here.)
With an absence of information-sharing between lenders, however, the borrower with ρi ≥ ρ*
can lower his overall cost of borrowing by obtaining two separate loans from two different lenders,
while creating the illusion for each lender that he is borrowing a fraction of his actual total—a
ubiquitous occurrence as reported by MFIs operating in competitive markets. In the example in
Figure 5, the less patient borrower with ρ* benefits by obtaining two loans from two different lenders
of size Vi (k i ) , and paying interest rate ri (Vi (k i )) < ri (2Vi (k i )) on each of the two different loans,
increasing his utility to Π iB ( ρ *)′ . Moreover, the lower interest rate sensitivity on the joint offer curve
Π1MFI ( ki ) + Π 2MFI (ki ) = 0 faced by the multiple-borrower induces the borrower to increase borrowing to

~
~
~
2 Vi (k i ) > 2Vi (k i ) by taking two loans of size Vi (k i ) at interest rate ~
ri (Vi (k i )) , further increasing the
impatient borrower’s utility from Π iB ( ρ *)′ to Π iB ( ρ *)′′ . Multiple contracting occurs in the absence of
full information because the lender can no longer infer ρi from the requested loan size. The lender
cannot distinguish between an impatient borrower taking two separate loans of the size a patient
borrower with the same ki would demand. Note in our example that instances of multiple contracting
will occur whenever the full-information equilibrium Vi for the least patient borrower is two or more
times greater than the equilibrium contract for the most patient borrower for any ki.17
This behavior creates an externality that raises the overall default rate for MFIs for two reasons:
First, because the interest rate is lower under multiple borrowing than it would have been with a single
lender, total borrowing and indebtedness increases within the portfolio of borrowers. Second, and more

16

The result is generalizable to a borrower taking more than two separate loans, given sufficient borrower impatience and
market competitors.
17
The result is generalizable to a borrower taking more than two separate loans, given sufficient borrower impatience and
market competitors.
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importantly to an individual MFI, the true probability of default is now a function of its own lending
and of some unknown quantity borrowed from elsewhere.
This makes the expected default rate of any given borrower i now equal to
ρ*

pˆ i =

ρ

( )

~
p(Vi )g (ρ i )dρ i + (1 − α ) p 2Vi g (ρ i )dρ i

ρ

ρ*
ρ

(10)

ρ

g (ρ i )dρ i − α g (ρ i )dρ i

ρ

ρ*

Defining γ ≡ 1 − G (ρ *) as the probability of multiple contracting, and letting pi (k i ) and ~
pi (k i ) equal
expected probabilities of default for borrowers (at a given level of ki) with single and multiple loans
respectively, we obtain
pˆ i ≡ p i (k i , Vi , α ) =

(1 − γ ) pi + γ (1 − α ) ~pi
1 − γα

,

(11)
dρ *
> 0 and so
dα

noting that γ = γ (α ) . Since an increase in α makes (9) less likely to be satisfied,

γ α < 0. (Note since G ( ρ ) and α are both assumed to be independent of the distribution of k, we know
γ and γ α are independent as well.) As seen in (11), as α→1, pˆ i → pi , or the default rate approaches
the full information case. Using (2) and (11), expected profits to the lender for borrower i now become

Π

MFI
i

= (1 − pˆ i )(ri − c )Vi − pˆ iVi (1 + c − β ) − F =

(

(1 − γ )Π iMFI + γ (1 − α )Π~ iMFI

)

1 − γα

(

,

(12)

)

~
~
~
where ΠiMFI = (1− pi )(ri − c)Vi − pi 1+ c − β Vi − F and ΠiMFI = (1− ~
pi )(ri − c)Vi − ~
pi 1+ c − β Vi − F . Equation

(12) yields the information necessary for Proposition 5:
PROPOSITION 5: If asymmetric information between lenders increases as the number of competing
lenders increases, borrowers receive less favorable loan contracts after entry of new lenders.
PROOF: The details of the proof are given in the Appendix. However, first note the positive relationship
between profits to each MFI and α. The Appendix shows that partial differentiation of (12) yields
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(

)

~
∂Π iMFI
Πi − Πi
= [γ (1 − γ ) − γ α (1 − α )]
> 0.
∂α
(1 − γα )2

Under Bertrand competition, each lender will adjust the contract to borrower i ∈

(13)
P

, so the resulting

equilibrium contract yields Π iMFI = 0 . If new entrants make information-sharing more difficult, total
differentiation of (12) reveals that each lender’s new zero-profit curve must lie strictly to the right and to
the interior of the old one. The lower-information equilibrium with more lenders in the market lies on a
lower isoprofit function for the borrower at which any size loan, offered at zero-profit to the lender, is
offered at a higher interest rate. The conclusion from the proof is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows
the change in the Bertrand competitive equilibrium as α falls.
Once the competing MFIs respond to multiple contracting by adjusting equilibrium contracts for all
clients, it is unclear whether or not the impatient have indeed benefited. The interest rate “discount”
received though multiple loan contracting may or may not compensate for the fact that every individual
loan contract is marginally worse. What is unambiguous is that patient borrowers with ρi < ρ*, who
find it optimal to borrow only from a single lender, have been hurt by reduced informational flows
between lenders, and the ensuing instances of multiple contracting by other borrowers. By undertaking
action clearly observable to only one lender, the impatient create a classical externality whose costs are
spread across the whole population of borrowers.
(Insert Figure 6 here.)
4.2 Effect of asymmetric information on the poorest borrowers
PROPOSITION 6: As asymmetric information between lenders increases, the poorest borrowers are
dropped from the lending portfolio.
PROOF: Consider the poorest borrower ikˆ ∈

(

( ))

P

who receives a loan with under Bertrand competition

( )

when Π iMFI (Vi** , ri** ) | α = 1 − pˆ i kˆi (ri − c )Vi − pˆ kˆi Vi (1 + c − β ) − F = 0 . Total differentiation yields

( p − p ) > 0 by
∂pˆ
pˆ
dkˆ
= [γ (1 − γ ) − γ α (1 − α )]
= − α , where pˆ k < 0 by assumption. We know that pˆ α ≡
∂α
dα
pˆ k
(1 − γα )2
~
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ˆ
differentiation of (11). Thus dk = − pˆ α < 0 , or as α declines to α′, the poorest borrower who receives an
dα

pˆ k

MFI loan must have initial assets kˆi + ψ > kˆi .
The intuition to the proof is straightforward. Increasing information asymmetries increase the cost of
lending to the entire portfolio of borrowers. Consider the poorest borrower receiving MFI credit under
Bertrand competition at a given level α of information sharing, the borrower who has initial assets k̂ i .
As informational flows decline with an increasing number of lenders in a market to α′ < α, the
probability of default increases by p̂α such that marginally profitable loans to borrowers with level of
initial assets k̂ i (and slightly above k̂ i ) become unprofitable. As a consequence, the dilution of
information between lenders resulting from the entry of new MFIs in a given area, even non-profit
institutions, may cause the poorest borrowers to be dropped from MFI portfolios.
4.3 Conclusions from extended model with asymmetric information:
•

With asymmetric information between competing MFIs, every loan contract yields a lower profit
to the borrower than under the full information benchmark. Patient borrowers are always worse
off with reduced information sharing. It is possible that the impatient borrowers are worse off as
well, if the negative externality of multiple contracting overwhelms the direct benefit.

•

If asymmetric information between lenders increases with the number of MFIs in the market,
competition has an unambiguously negative effect on both the most poor and the most patient
borrowers in the portfolio.

•

Optimal information sharing between lenders must include not only data on defaulting
borrowers, the lista negra, but also continually updated information on current borrowers, even
those who are not defaulting, or the lista blanca.
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5. Policy Implications

It seems intuitive that the dramatic growth in the number of MFIs in developing countries, and
the ensuing competition between them, would have an unambiguously positive effect on low-income
entrepreneurs in developing countries. However, this research presents number of hypotheses that
provide reason to question this notion.
We believe that a number of policy conclusions flow from this research. At the broadest level,
the results of the first part of our paper may extend to other instances in which altruistic motivation
induces a non-profit institution to cross-subsidize. Examples may include medical or health services,
socially motivated education programs, or provision of low-income housing, in which there exists some
degree of competition between for-profit and non-profit entities.
More specifically to microfinance, our research implies that the structure of funding is
unimportant in monopolistic markets, whereas the motivation of lenders is less important in competitive
markets. Therefore, as competition increases, the onus for the inclusiveness of the market passes from
the practitioners of microfinance to the donors. Yet the very existence of competitive markets hinges on
the idea that grant funding be used in a competitive market only to subsidize the cost of lending to the
poor. In light of this, our research supports the notion put forth by Morduch, that financially selfsufficient MFIs should co-exist with their subsidized counterparts, provided that these subsidies are
carefully restricted to the poorest borrowers.
Targeting of subsidies is difficult to achieve in practice, as such constraints are hard to monitor,
and MFIs themselves may not be able to easily identify the dividing line between profitable and
unprofitable clients. In light of these issues, it may be most practical to reserve grants strictly for
geographical expansion of MFI activity into poor, unserved areas. In this way, donors can avoid
undermining competitive markets without placing expensive, ill-defined restrictions upon practitioners.
It also may be possible to restrict grant funding to methodologies that do not appeal to profitable
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borrowers, such as joint liability lending contracts where loan amounts are typically small and
organizational costs are high.
Another clear implication from our research is the need for credit bureaus, or internet-based
central risk-management systems, which identify outstanding debt in addition to cases of default. In
general the astounding growth in MFI lending in many areas has vastly outpaced the ability of MFIs to
monitor borrower quality and indebtedness. Among the Central American countries, for example, there
remains great heterogeneity in informational infrastructure. While some countries such as El Salvador
have established reasonably well-functioning centralized risk-management structures, others such as
Nicaragua lag far behind in this area, although the density of MFI activity is extremely high. At this
stage in the microfinance movement, the establishment of such centralized risk networks must become a
leading priority to ensure the success and sustainability of the microfinance movement in LDCs.
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Appendix

EXPLICIT FORMULATION OF ASSUMPTIONS AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS:
Assumption 1: “Moneylender Feasibility”. Since the maximum interest rate acceptable to a borrower
lies very close to β − 1 , we can approximate the condition for the least favorable loan to a borrower that

()

leaves zero profit to the moneylender as Π iML = (1 − pi ) β Vi + pi βVi − (1 + c m )Vi = F m . Substituting
the expression for Vi* (ki ) in (5b) into the moneylender zero-profit condition, and solving for k shows

(

2 pv F m β − 1 + c m
−1
that for moneylender feasibility k must be ≥
p+
−
pk
β −β
β −β

)

.

Assumption 2: “Microfinance Lending Environment”. Lemma 2 shows that MFI profits in competitive
equilibrium can be expressed as Π *i =

∆=

[(

)

]

1
(∆ − p i ) 2 − (∆m − p im ) 2 ( β − β ) + F m − F , where
pv

β − (1 + c)
β − (1 + c m )
and ∆m =
. Setting this expression equal to zero and substituting in
β −β
β −β

pi = p + p k k i + p vVi shows that the equilibrium break-even level of initial borrower assets for the MFI
2 p ( F − F m ) ∆ + ∆m
−1
p+ v m
−
. By setting the above boundary condition in Assumption 1 for
is kˆ =
pk
2
c −c
k less than k̂ and solving for parameter conditions, we find that an unprofitable borrower will exist
provided that

2 pv ( F − F m ) >

cm − c

β −β

, which holds given sufficiently high β . Provided that

k > kˆ + ξ , more than one profitable borrower will exist, which satisfies the 2nd part of Assumption 2.

Boundary Conditions on Default Rate: Here we delineate parameters for the model to ensure that

[ ]

0 < p(Vi , k i ) < 1 for ∀ k i ∈ k , k . Substituting Vi* (k i ) =
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1
[∆ − p − pk ki ] into the default function
2 pv

yields pi (k i ) =

1
( p + ∆ + p k k i ) . Recalling that pk < 0, our model parameters must ensure p(k ) < 1 and
2

()

p k > 0 . The conditions are thus that k >

1
( p + ∆ − 2) and k < 1 ( p + ∆ ) . The former always
− pk
− pk

holds since p + ∆ − 2 is always < 0. The latter condition that k <

boundary condition in Assumption 2 provided

or 3∆ + ∆m + 2 p k ξ >

1
( p + ∆ ) is consistent with the
− pk

2 p ( F − F m ) ∆ + ∆m
1
( p + ∆) > − 1 p + v m
−
− ξp k ,
2
− pk
pk
c −c

4 pv (F − F m )
, which holds given sufficiently high β relative to pv.
cm − c

Proof of LEMMA 1: We show in turn that (i) the constraint set impose by any PC (given as a reservation
level of borrower profit) is compact and convex; (ii) the contract that maximizes lender profit is unique
for every PC; (iii) that (i) and (ii) yield a set of points that form a Pareto-efficient contract curve for
each borrower and lender by the assumptions of the model.
(i) Assumption 1, which says that every borrower in the pool is offered some contract by a monopolistic
moneylender, ensures that a PC exists and is defined by some level of borrower profit Π iB for each
borrower i. Re-arranging the borrower’s profit function in (1) and solving for ri at any (non-negative)
constant level of profit of Π iB , yields ri = β −

Π iB
− 1 . Differentiation gives
Vi (1 − p − p k k i − p vVi )

dri Π iB (1 − p − p k k i − 2 p vVi )
, meaning that borrower isoprofit curves are positively (negatively)
=
2
dVi
Vi (1 − p − p k k ) − p vVi 2

[

]

sloped for Vi < (>)(1 − p − p k k i ) / 2 pv . Furthermore, we have
d 2 ri
dVi

2

=

[

− 2 Π iBVi (1 − p − p k k i − p vVi ) p vVi (1 − p − p k k i − p vV ) + (1 − p − p k k i − 2 p vV ) 2
4

Vi (1 − p − p k k i − p vV ) 4

] < 0 . Thus, the

borrower’s isoprofit curves are concave and decreasing in ri, which implies that the upper contour set
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above any isoprofit contour is a convex set. Setting ri = 0 for the borrower’s profit function in (1) and
solving for Vi, note that the each isoprofit curve of the borrower, for any Π B ≥ ε , intersects the Vi axis
B

H

at the positive values V and V

L

1
Π
. That the
=
(1− pi − pk ki ) ± (1− pi − pk ki ) 2 − 4( pV )
2 pV
β −1

constraint set is closed follows from the observation that (a) Π B (Vi , ri ) is a continuous function; and
(b) the constraint set is the intersection of {(Vi , ri ) VL ≤ Vi ≤ VH and ri ≥ 0} and the inverse image, under

{

}

Π B , of the set Π iB Π iB ≥ Π iB (Vi , ri ) . Boundedness follows from the fact that the constraint set lies at

and below the isoprofit curve defined by (1) within and including the positive values V H and V L ,
together with non-negativity constraint that ri ≥ 0 . Since all inequalities are weak, the constraint set is
bounded. Therefore, the constraint set is compact and convex, and a maximum exists.
(ii) The properties of the lender’s isoprofit contours can be similarly derived re-arranging (2)
while holding lender profits constant and solving for ri, yielding ri =

Vi (c + p i (1 − β )) + F L + Π iL
Vi (1 − p i )

,

pvVi (1 + c − β ) − ( Π L + F L )(1 − pi − pvVi )
dri
L = {MFI, ML}, for which
, and
=
2
dVi
Vi (1 − pi ) 2
2

d 2 ri
dV i

2

[

2 p v2V i (1 − p i )(1 + c − β ) + 2V i ( Π L + F L )(1 − p i ) (1 − p i − p vV i )(1 − p i ) + p v2V i
4

=

4

V i (1 − p i ) 4

Since for the borrower and lender isoprofit curves

]

.

dri
dr
< 0 and i > 0 respectively for
dVi
dVi

Vi > (1 − p − p k k i ) / 2 p v (i.e. for (1− pi − pvV ) < 0 ), a sufficient condition to establish a lender maximum
at the tangency point to Π iB is that ri (Vi ) is convex for VL ≤ Vi ≤ (1− p − pk ki ) / 2 pv . When (1− pi − pvV ) > 0,
which is true at V * (ki ) by Assumption 3, it is easily shown that for sufficiently large p k , Π iL + F L ≥ 0 .
Thus the lender’s isoprofit curve is increasing and convex over VL ≤ Vi ≤ (1− p − pk ki ) / 2 pv and hence at
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(

)

*
*
B
V * (ki ) . That the tangency point Vi , ri defined by V * (ki ) at each level of Π i and i ∈

is unique is

shown by equation (5b) and the fact that ri (Vi ) is one-to-one over the domain [VL ,V = (1− p − pk ki ) / 2 pv ] .
We know that the optimal V * (ki ) that defines each horizontal contract curve lies within [V L ,V H ] (and
thus satisfies the non-negativity constraints) for ∀ k i ∈ [k , k ] , since re-arranging (5b) yields the
2 pv F m
−1
1
p+
condition k >
( p − ∆ ) , which satisfies the boundary condition that k ≥
− ∆ in
pk
β −β
− pk
Assumption 1. Furthermore, note that Vi* (ki ) can never exceed V H since V * (k i ) < (1 − p − p k k i ) / 2 p v .
(iii) Assumption 1 guarantees that the PC (and thus a contract curve) is defined for all i ∈

with each

lender. That the locus of points on the contract curve are Pareto-efficient can be proven by
contradiction: If a point on the contract curve were not Pareto-efficient, another contract would exist for
which Π iL (Vi , ri ) could be increased holding Π iB (Vi , ri ) constant. But then this point could not have
been a maximum of the objective function, and hence could not be on the contract curve.

Proof of LEMMA 2: We prove each part of the LEMMA sequentially:
(i). Partial differentiation of equation (5b) shows that

∂Vi ∗ ∂Vi m ∗ − pk
=
=
> 0.
∂k i
∂ki
2 pv

(ii). To show that MFI profits in competition with a moneylender are higher for higher k i , we solve
explicitly for the equilibrium MFI loan as a function of parameters. First, we utilize the fact that the
zero-profit constraint of the moneylender will bind for all loans under competition. Hence we can solve
for the equilibrium rate of interest charged by the moneylender, ri m ∗ for ∀ i in the MFI portfolio. Letting
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pim be the borrower’s probability of default to the moneylender and where again ∆m =

then Vi m =

∆m − pim
, so the zero-profit interest rate will be ri m∗
pv

β − (1 + c m )
,
β −β

pv F m
− pim β + (1 + c m )
∆m − pim
=
− 1.
1 − pim

In the continuous equilibrium, the PC will bind such that Π iB (Vi m∗ , ri m∗ ) = Π iB (Vi ∗ , ri∗ ) for all
borrowers. (To see this, suppose it did not; by increasing ri to the point where the PC binds, the MFI
could retain that borrower in the portfolio

∪

~ NP

and relax the BC. Therefore, the original contract

could not have been an equilibrium.) We substitute ri m ∗ into the binding PC
pv F m
− pim β + (1 + c m )
m
m
∆ − pi
(1 − pi )(∆ − pi )( β − (1 + ri* )) = (1 − pim )(∆m − pim )( β −
) and solve for the
1 − pim
competitive equilibrium MFI rate of interest ri* as a function of the parameters of the model, obtaining
ri = β −
*

(∆m − pim ) 2 ( β − β ) − pv F m
(1 − pi )(∆ − pi )

− 1 . Substituting for ri* and Vi* , we can now solve explicitly for

the equilibrium level of MFI profit with the PC and the moneylender zero-profit constraints binding,

(∆

m

Π

= [(1− pi ) β −

MFI *
i

)

2

− p m (β − β ) − pv F m
(1− pi )(∆ − pi )

+ pi β − (1+ c)]

[(∆ − pi ) 2 − (∆m − pim ) 2 ](β − β ) m
∆ − pi
−F =
+F − F .
pv
pv

Taking the derivative of this equilibrium MFI profit level with respect to k, we get
m
m
∂Π iMFI * − 2 p k ( β − β )[(∆ − pi ) − (∆ − pi )]
=
, which > 0 if c m − c > ( pi − pim )( β − β ) . Substituting
∂k
pv

in the default function, pi = p + p k k i + pvVi , into this expression, we can rewrite this inequality as
c m − c > p v (Vi − Vi m )( β − β ) . Solving explicitly for the optimal loan size as a function of k i ,
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Vi =

∆ − p − pk ki
∆m − p − p k k i
∆ − ∆m
and Vi m =
, so Vi − Vi m =
. Hence the required condition for
2 pv
2 pv
2 pv

∂Π iMFI *
β − (1 + c) − β + (1 + c m )
> 0 reduces to c m − c > pv ( β − β )
∂k
2 pv ( β − β )

or c m − c >

cm − c
.
2

By Assumption 2, Π *i (k ) > 0 , and Π *i (k ) < 0 . Π *i (k i ) is a continuous, increasing function of k
because p is a continuous function of k and pv is a positive constant, so by the Intermediate Value
Theorem there exists some k̂ , with k < kˆ < k , for which Π *i (kˆ) = 0 . We denote as the “break-even
borrower” the individual iˆ whose capital endowment k̂ i is the closest to k̂ while being ≥ k̂ ; thus for
the break even-borrower it will be the case that Π *i (kiˆ ) ≥ 0 but Π *i (k iˆ−1 ) < 0 .
(iii). That MFI client-maximization implies cross subsidization from

P

to

~ NP

flows directly from

the preceding arguments; the MFI maximizes its number of clients by maximizing profits for
minimizing losses in capturing

~ NP

P

and

, both subject to the PC, and hence uses profits from the former to

cross-subsidize the latter. To show that it is able to do so, first note that
∂ 2 Π MFI * − 2 p k ( β − β )( p k − p k )
=
= 0 , so the profits of the MFI in equilibrium are an increasing and
pv
∂k 2
linear function of k . Since we have assumed that k̂ i refers to the assets of the borrower who weakly
satisfies a zero-profit condition for the MFI under competition, Π MFI * (kˆi ) ≥ 0 . The linearity of the
profit function combined with the uniform distribution of k implies that
Π * (k iˆ ) + Π * (k iˆ +1 ) ≥ −(Π * (k iˆ −1 )) . Since Assumption 2 tells us that there exist one unprofitable borrower
and more than one profitable borrower, kiˆ +1 and k iˆ−1 exist and thus cross-subsidization of at least k iˆ−1 is
possible.
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n

(iv). Let S + ≡

i = iˆ

Π *i (k i ) + G be the surplus profits from lending to profitable borrowers plus the

subsidy received by the MFI. In addition, let S m = S + +

m
j =1

Π *i (k iˆ − j ) for m = 1, . ., iˆ − 1 be the finite,

decreasing sequence of total profits from lending to successive borrowers below k̂ . The maximum
number of borrowers n * , and hence the equilibrium, will be reached when S m is as close to zero as
possible while remaining non-negative. Consider three cases: (a) If S m = 0 for some m * , then the BC
and the PCs all bind in equilibrium, and n * = n − iˆ + m * + 1 . For simplicity of exposition we have
assumed case (a) to be operative in our analysis. The alternative cases do not affect the fundamental
insights of our model, but are nevertheless interesting. (b) If S m > 0 for m * but S m < 0 for m * +1, then
some small residual profit exists due to the discrete distribution of k i . In this case an infinite number of
equilibrium contracts exist in which this residual profit may be distributed within the portfolio, and
either the BC or some borrowers’ PCs do not bind, but m * and hence n * remain unchanged. (c) If
S m > 0 when n * = n , the MFI has surplus funds even after reaching the entire group of potential

borrowers. Note, however, even in this case n * = n remains unique regardless of the rule used to

[

]

dispose of excess profits. Thus for any given MFI subsidy G ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ 1, iˆ − m * − 1 receive the
monopolistic moneylender contract (Vi , ri ) = (Vi m , ri m ) , and no loan contract from the MFI, and

[

]

∀i ∈ iˆ − m * , n receive the MFI loan contract (Vi , ri ) = (Vi * , ri* ) and no loan from the moneylender.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Consider competition between two client-maximizing MFIs, h ={1, 2}
with non-targeted subsidies

and

, respectively. A best response by MFIh to any an existing subsidy

pattern involves a re-allocation of subsidy over

so as to minimize the subsidy cost of capturing each

borrower, subject to the PC and BC. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium must satisfy the following
necessary conditions: (i) Π iMFI = Π MFI
for ∀i, j ∈
j
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P

∪

~ NP

and h ={1, 2}, or that the loss from

capturing all n1* + n2* borrowers in the total portfolios of 1, 2 must be equal. (Suppose not: If
Π iMFI > Π MFI
and i and j belong to the portfolio of different MFIs, this implies that MFIh with i can
j

release i and capture j from MFI~h while relaxing its BC; if i and j both belong to MFIh, then this implies
that Π iMFI or Π MFI
must be > or < Π MFI
, where borrower x is some borrower in the portfolio of
j
x
MFI~h. If Π iMFI or Π MFI
> Π MFI
, then borrower x can be captured from MFI~h while relaxing the BC
j
x
< Π MFI
, then either i or j can be captured from MFIh by MFI~h, thus
of MFIh. If Π iMFI or Π MFI
j
x
relaxing the BC of MFI~h.) (ii) The PC must be binding for the poorest borrower i ∈

∪

~ NP

, where

i = ik~ . (Suppose not: If the PC is not satisfied, then this is a contradiction because ik~ cannot be in the

total MFI portfolio,

∪

P

~ NP

. If the PC is satisfied, but non-binding for ik~ , then by LEMMA 2,

borrower ik~ -1 can be captured for a lower subsidy cost than ik~ by either MFIh or MFI~h (assuming
sufficiently small ξ), thus relaxing the BC of either MFI.) (iii) The BC must bind for both 1, 2.
(Suppose not: In this case, an additional borrower can be captured by MFIh if its BC is not binding, and
n1* and n2* are not maximized.) The unique Nash equilibrium that satisfies all three necessary conditions

is the subsidy pattern in which n1* + n2* borrowers in
i = ik~ , so that

+

(

∪

~ NP

receive the subsidy equal to Π iMFI ,

)

= n1* + n 2* ⋅ Π iMFI . The subsidy allocation is a Nash equilibrium since the

subsidy patterns by 1, 2 constitute a mutual best response; it is a unique Nash equilibrium because it is
the only subsidy pattern that satisfies the necessary conditions, (i),(ii), and (iii), for a Nash equilibrium.
Thus each borrower i ∈

(n

*
1

+

+ n2* )

∪

~ NP

will receive a subsidy equal to

+
and MFIh will lend to
n + n2*

borrowers, and the share of borrowers for MFIh will be

*
1

+

as seen in Figure 3,

where the specific types of borrower i served by each institution are undetermined.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: (For simplicity, and without loss of generality, consider the case in which
= 0 for all competing MFIs.) Let the set of possible contracts {Vi , ri }α , for some borrower i ∈

P

satisfy Π iMFI (Vi , ri ) = 0 α , or zero MFI profits at information-sharing level α. Note that the Bertrand
equilibrium MFI contract {Vi** , ri** }α ∈ {Vi , ri }α , and that by LEMMA 1 the Bertrand equilibrium contract
is Pareto efficient. First we show that as α declines to α′, we have Π iMFI (Vi , ri ) < 0 for all {Vi , ri }α .
Partially differentiating the right-hand-side of (12) we obtain

[

[

]

[

]]

∂Π iMFI
1
~
~
~
~
~
, which
= (1 − γα ) γ α Π − αγ α Π − γ α Π − γΠ + (αγ α + γ ) Π − γΠ + γΠ − αγ Π
∂α
(1 − γα )2

[(

)

(

~
~
~
~
~
~
~
= γ α Π − Π − αΠ − γαΠ + γα 2 Π + γαΠ + αΠ − γαΠ + γαΠ − γα 2 Π + γ (1 − γ ) Π − Π

)]

1

(1 − γα )2

and through algebraic manipulation and cancellation of terms, reduces to

(

)

~
∂Π iMFI
Π−Π
= [γ (1 − γ ) − γ α (1 − α )]
> 0 . Thus as α falls to α′, we have Π iMFI (Vi , ri ) < 0 for all {Vi , ri }α ,
2
∂α
(1 − γα )

and therefore Π iB (Vi** , ri** ) α cannot be a Bertrand equilibrium contract for borrower i at α′, i.e.

{V

i

**

}

(

)

, ri** α ∉ {Vi , ri }α ' . Second, we show that the Bertrand equilibrium contract Π iB Vi ** , ri** = 0 α ' is

less favorable to the borrower than Π iB (Vi** , ri** ) α . Totally differentiating the left-hand-side of (12)
yields

(

)

∂pˆ
( p − ~p ) < 0 from
dri pˆ α 1 + ri − β
< 0, noting that pˆ α ≡
= [γ (1 − γ ) − γ α (1 − α )]
=
∂α
(1 − pˆ i )
dα
(1 − γα )2

differentiation of (11). Thus we know that Π iMFI (Vi** , ri** ) = 0 α ' is characterized by a higher ri for any
given level of Vi relative to the {Vi , ri }α pair that satisfies Π iMFI (Vi** , ri** ) = 0 α . Noting that borrower
profits are monotonically decreasing in ri, i.e. that

∂Π iB
= −Vi (1 − p i ) < 0 , it must be true that
∂ri
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(

Π iB Vi** , ri**

)

α ′ is less than Π iB (Vi** , ri** ) α since under α′, borrower i ∈

P

pays a strictly higher

interest rate ri for any level of borrowed capital Vi at α′ than at information-sharing level α > α′.
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Table 1: Growth in Microenterprise lending, Nicaragua
Borrowers
Portfolio
%Arrears Borrowers
Portfolio US$ %Arrears
1999
US$ 1999
1999
2001
2001
2001
10,568
1,711,801
8.00
24,000
2,995,942
10.39
ASODENIC
6,087
6,230,864
0.21
16,402
6,948,907
1.63
FAMA
15,275
1,688,417
0.00
24,888
2,680,631
9.00
FINCA
2,129
913,945
4.40
5,940
1,609,631
5.20
FUNDENUSE
10,121
317,870
1.25
10,561
629,385
0.35
ProMujer
Five-MFI Total
44,180
10,862,897
1.79
81,791
14,864,496
5.06
Source: USAID Microfinance Results Reporting. Averages for 5-MFI Total are portfolio weighted.

(Wydick and McIntosh, “Competition and Microfinance” JDE)
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Π iML >> 0
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Figure 4

(Wydick and McIntosh, “Competition and Microfinance” JDE)
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